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INTRODUCTION: STATE V. MANN AND
THOMAS RUFFIN IN HISTORY AND MEMORY
SALLY GREENE & ERIC L. MULLER

In one of his earliest opinions on the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, Judge Thomas Ruffin' penned what is undoubtedly the
coldest and starkest defense of the brutality of slavery ever to appear
In the assault and battery
in an American judicial opinion.
prosecution State v. Mann,2 Ruffin created for slave owners an
absolute immunity from criminal liability for the physical punishment
of their slaves, no matter how cruelly inflicted. "The power of the
master must be absolute," ruled Ruffin, "to render the submission of
the slave perfect."3
This notorious decision provided fodder for Harriet Beecher
Stowe, who saw Ruffin as an honorable and decent man trapped in a
culture of vicious racial subordination.4 The slender body of criticism
that began with Stowe and other abolitionists5 has been embraced and
expanded, more than a century later, by academic legal historians, for
whom Ruffin has become emblematic of all that was wrong with the

1. Editor's Note: In 1829, when Thomas Ruffin was elected by the General
Assembly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court was made up of three
"Judges" and one "Chief Justice." See Martin H. Brinkley, Supreme Court of North
Carolina: A Brief History, http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/copyright/sc/facts.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2009). When the court heard the State v. Mann case, Ruffin was styled a
Judge. In 1833, Ruffin's peers elected him Chief Justice, a title he held until 1852. Six
years later, he returned to serve one final year, again as Judge. For more information on
the chronology of Ruffin's time on the court, see generally Judge James A. Wynn, Jr.,
State v. Mann: Judicial Choice or Judicial Duty?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 991 (2009). During and
since his lifetime, scholars and historians have referred to Ruffin using both the Judge and
Chief Justice titles. For consistency and simplicity, and because Ruffin held the title of
Judge at the time State v. Mann was decided, the articles in this Issue refer to Ruffin as
"Judge," unless specifically referring to Ruffin in his capacity as Chief Justice.
2. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
3. Id. at 266.
4. See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, A KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 78 (1853) ("No

one can read this decision, ... so dreadful in its results, without feeling at once deep
respect for the man and horror for the system.").
5. See generally Laura H. Korobkin, Appropriating Law in Harriet Beecher Stowe's
Dred, 62 NINETEENTH-CENTURY

LITERATURE 380 (2007) (contextualizing Stowe's

critiques of Ruffin and State v. Mann within a larger body of abolitionist criticism).
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antebellum South. In 1996, for instance, Sanford Levinson raised the
following provocative questions about Judge Ruffin:
Can one have, as apparently Harriet Beecher Stowe did, "deep
respect for the man" Ruffin even as one despises the system
that he served? Would we, for example, wish to honor him by
placing his portrait in American law schools as a presumed
inspiration to further generations of law students as to what it
means to be a "distinguished" lawyer or judge, or does
authorship
of State v. Mann disqualify him from any such
6
honor?
Within the popular narratives of Ruffin's place in North Carolina
history, however, such questions have gone unasked. While Ruffin
the judge has received the highest of praise for his overall
contribution to the development of the law, his opinion in State v.
Mann has been simply ignored. At the dedication of a heroic-scale
bronze statue of Judge Ruffin at the entrance to the North Carolina
Supreme Court building (now the Court of Appeals) in 1915,
Governor Locke Craig called him "one of the greatest judges that our
race has produced." 7 In 1922, a dormitory was named after him on
the UNC-Chapel Hill campus.'
Roscoe Pound secured Ruffin's
reputation as one of the ten greatest judges of the golden age of the
American common-law tradition,9 an honor proudly proclaimed in
official histories of the Supreme Court of North Carolina from the
early twentieth century l to the present." Even today, the official
history of the Supreme Court of North Carolina praises Ruffin's
accomplishments without so much as mentioning the infamous Mann
12
opinion.

6. Sanford Levinson, Allocating Honor and Acting Honorably: Some Reflections
Provoked by the Cardozo Conference on Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1996).
7. Locke Craig, Acceptance, in ADDRESSES AT THE UNVEILING AND
PRESENTATION TO THE STATE OF THE STATUE OF THOMAS RUFFIN BY THE NORTH
CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION:
DELIVERED IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 26, 26 (1915).

8. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Engineering Information
Services, Ruffin Residence Hall, http://www.planroom.unc.edu/bldg/detail.asp?id=117
(follow "Aliases & Notes" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 4,30 n.2 (1938).
10. Hon. Robert W. Winston, A Century of Law in North Carolina,176 N.C. 763, 786
(1919) (reprinting remarks from the Proceedings of the North Carolina Bar Association in
celebration of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina).
11. Brinkley, supra note 1.
12. Id.

2009]
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On November 16, 2007, in the presence of a portrait of the judge
commissioned in the 1840s for what is now jointly called the Dialectic
and Philanthropic Societies at UNC-Chapel Hill, a symposium of
legal scholars and historians was convened to reconsider the legacy of
Thomas Ruffin in light of State v. Mann. This Issue of the North
Carolina Law Review consists of papers developed from that
symposium on "The Perils of Public Homage: State v. Mann and
Thomas Ruffin in History and Memory." The questions raised in the
following pages could not be more timely. In the wake of the election
of our first African American president, the essays in this Issue add
new perspective to countless other conversations on race as we work
our way toward putting contradictory pieces of history and memory
together. For as the historian Ira Berlin has aptly written, "only by
testing memory against history can a sense of a collective past be
sustained."13
As conveners of the symposium, we extend our thanks to all the
participants, to all who attended and made the event a success, and
especially to our sponsors, the UNC School of Law, the UNC Center
for the Study of the American South, and the UNC Institute for the
Arts and Humanities.

13. Ira Berlin, American Slavery in History and Memory, in SLAVERY, RESISTANCE,
FREEDOM 1, 20 (Gabor Boritt & Scott Hancock eds., 2007).
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